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CHARITABLE HOSPITALS' LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE:
ABROGATION OF THE MEDICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE
DISTINCTION
DELIMITING the extent of a hospital's liability for the negligent acts
of its doctors, nurses, and employees has, during the past half-century,
proven to be a particularly perplexing judicial problem.' Principles
based upon variant reasoning and indicating no small degree of con-
fusion have been propounded,2 reflecting two largely incompatible in-
fluences: the theory that a charity should be favored by the law; and
the theory that, like any legal entity, even a charitable institution has a
duty to exercise due care in the course of its operations.
Originally, virtual unanimity8 obtained in exempting charitable
hospitals from respondeat superior liability, owing to the widespread
following of McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital.4  To ra-
tionalize this position, the courts generally have adopted either a trust
fund theory,5 an implied waiver theory,' a public-policy theory,7 or
' See Gerber and Tyree, Liability of Hospitals for Negligence, The Modern Hos-
pital, May, 1957, P. 84 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS §§ 29.16-17 (1956).
'In President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 13o F.2d 81o, 812
(D.C. Cir. 1942), the Court said: ". . . the cmses are almost riotous with dissent.
Reasons are even more varied than results. These are earmarks of law in flux. They
indicate something wrong at the beginning or that something has become wrong
since then. They also show that correction though in process, is incomplete.'
'Decisions from almost every jurisdiction have advocated at some time a general
rule of immunity. Gerber and Tyree, supra note i, at 88.
a x2o Mass. 432 (1876). This decision cited as its sole authority for non-liability
of charities an English case, Holliday v. St. Leonard's, ii C.B.N.S. 192, 142 Eng. Rep.
769 (186o). This English case, 'however, had been based on dictum in Duncan v.
Findlater, 6 Clark & Fin. 894, 71 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839), which had been expressly
overruled in Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L.R. z H.L. 93 (x866). The Holliday
case had itself been overruled. See Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214
(1871). "The charity immunity doctrine originated in England and was transplanted
to this country by judicial accident." 20 U. CIN. L. RE-. 412 (i95i). Excellent
discussions of this oddity appear in: President and Directors of Georgetown College v.
Hughes, 130 F.2d So (D.C. Cir. 1942); Andrews v. Y.M.C.A. of Des Moines, 226
Iowa 374, 284 N.W. i86 (i939).
'Arkansas, Maryland, Massachusetts and Oregon base charitable immunity on the
trust fund theory. Arkansas Valley Co-op. Rural Electric Co. v. Elkins, 2oo Ark.
883, 141 S.W.2d 538 (940) ; Loeffler v. Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hospital, 130 Md.
265, oo Atl. 301 (x197); Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66,
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simply, a nonapplicability of respondeat superior theory.8  Analytically,
however, these four theories exhibit but different facets of the same
public policy consideration 9
Nevertheless, the more recent decisions, evincing increased dissatis-
faction with the unqualified exemption rule, have effectively abrogated
it in some respects in most jurisdictions.1 Illustrative is President and
.J26 N.E. 392 (92o); Gregory v. Salem General Hospital, 175 Ore. 464, 153 P.zd
837 (1944).
In Pennsylvania, the trust fund theory is still the principal basis for charitable
immunity. Bond v. City of Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.zd 328 (195x); Gable v.
Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Ad. bo87 (i91o). But cf. note 38 infra,
and text thereto.
The theory is also still applicable to the extent that the funds of the charitable
institution are actually held in trust in Illinois, Tennessee and Colorado. Moore v.
Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950); Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23
Tenn. App. 135, 127 .S.W.2d 284 (1938); O'Connor v. Boulder Colo. Sanitarium
Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.zd 835 (1939).
• See Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P.ad 849
(1938), and cases there cited; Powers v. Massachusetts Homoeopathic Hospital, io9
Fed. 294 (ist Cir. 19o ) ; Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal Church, 147 Mich.
230, i1o N.W. 951 (1907); cf. Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul,
131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (921).
"See Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 59S; Jurjevich
v. Hotel Dieu, 11 So.2d 632 (La. App. 1943); Jones v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic
Church, 7 N.J. 533, 8z A.2d 187 (195i); D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hospital,
1o N.J.L. 61, 127 Ad. 340 (1925); Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A., 212 S.c. 337,
47 S.E.2d 788 (1948). The trust fund theory has been expressly adopted as a vehicle
to express the public policy of Kentucky. Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ais'n, 193 Ky.
400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921).
' Charitable institutions have been held not subject to liability resulting from master-
servant relationships because the hospital performs a quasi-public function and seeks
no profit from its work. Morrison v. Henke, 16S Wis. 166, x6o N.W. 173 (1916).
' "The 'trust fund theory' comprehends all that is involved in 'public policy,' with
only an apparent difference in approach. This is true likewise of 'respondeat superior'
and 'implied waiver.'" President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130
F.2d 81o, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
'0 "Almost every jurisdiction recognizes at least one of these modifications of rules
[of qualified liability or qualified immunity] and some recognize several." Gerber
and Tyree, supra- note x, at 93. A survey of the liability status of charitable institutions
appears in 2o U. CiN. L. REv. 412 (195i). Absolute immunity exists only in a few
states, among which are Massachusetts and Wisconsin. Mastrangelo v. Maverick Dis-
pensary, 115 N.E.2d 455 (Mass. 1953) ; Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235
Mass. 66, x26 N.E. 392 (1920); Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N.W.2d 2x2
(1942); Schumaker v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc'y, 218 Wis. x69, 26o N.W. 476
(z935) ; cf. Smith v. Congregation of St. Rose, 26S Wis. 393, 61 N.W.2d 896 (1953).
Pennsylvania also appears to have retained full immunity. Gable v. Sisters of St.
Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 AUt. 1087 (191o). But see, note 38 infra, No decisions
have been found on the subject in New Mexico or South Dakota.
Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes," wherein Mr. Justice
Rutledge12 stated:
The rule of immunity is out of step with the general trend of
legislative and judicial policy in distributing losses incurred by
individuals through the operation of an enterprise among all who
benefit by it rather than in leaving them wholly to be borne by
those who sustain them. The rule of immunity- itself has given
way gradually.... It is disintegrating. 3
Thus, liability has increasingly been imposed on charitable institutions
for injuries to strangers and paying patients,14 and for negligence in the
selection and retention of employees. 5
22 13o F.2d 8io (D.C. Cir. 1942).
" All six justices concurred as to the hospital's liability, but were divided as to the
reason for liability. Justices Miller and Edgerton agreed with Justice Rutledge's
opinion adopting the rule of absolute liability; Chief Justice Groner, Justices Stephens
and Vinson were of the opinion that the hospital should be liable because the person
was a stranger to the charity.
21 13o F.zd 8o, 827.
"Liability for injuries to strangers is based on the ground that such persons are
not beneficiaries of the charity but, rather, are innocent, uninterested outsiders. Even
if a charity may be exempted from liability to its beneficiaries, public policy could not
allow the immunity to be extended to strangers. "A charity should not be permitted
to inflict injury on some without the right of redress in order to bestow charity upon
others." Cohen v. General Hospital Soe'y of Connecticut, 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435
(193x). In the Cohen case plaintiff was the husband of a patient waiting to remove
the patient. Accord: Lindroth v. Christ Hospital, zi N.J. 588, 123 A.zd 1o (1956)
(plaintiff was a surgeon injured in the hospital elevator) S Daniels v. Rahway Hospital,
1o N.J. Misc. 585, Y60 At. 644 (1932) (plaintiff was driving his automobile on a
public highway when struck by a hospital ambulance) ; Cowans v. North Carolina
Baptist Hospitals, 197. N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672 (1929) (plaintiff was a servant of the
hospital).
Courts have allowed exception to the immunity rule on the basis that a paying
patient, like a stranger, is not a beneficiary of the hospital's charitable activities. Wheat
v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 297 P.2d 1041 (Idaho x956)5 Mississippi
Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So.2d 142 (195). The Mississippi
Baptist Hospital case contains an excellent discussion explaining why each of the
complete immunity theories is inapplicable. See note 36 infra. Immunity is based
on the giving and receiving of charity rather than on the nature of the hospital or in-
stitution. Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915). Liability
to a paying patient on the basis of an implied contract of reasonable care was refused
in Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392 (1920).
However, ". . . [most] states that accept the rule of the hospital's immunity make
it applicable to paying and non-paying patients alike." Gerber and Tyree, supra note
x, at 95, and cases there cited.
"'A charitable hospital is held liable for the negligent selection and retention of its
employees on the ground that the institution itself, rather than an employee, is negligent.
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This more recent trend is well exemplified by decisions in New
York, where the first indication of reluctance to follow the McDonald
rule was evidenced in the adoption of a unique qualification, known as
the Schloendorff rule.16 Recognizing that there were certain acts
performed by doctors and nurses which, although unrelated to their
professional or medical activities, bore some relationship to the admin-
istration of the hospital, this latter rule imposed liability on the hospital
if a negligent injury occurred in connection therewith.1 7  That this rule
did not operate without some dissatifaction, however, is illustrated in
The selection and retention is often referred to as a "corporate act" to justify the exemp-
tion from immunity to the respondeat superior doctrine. Edwards v. Grace Hospital
Soc'y, 130 Conn. 568, 36 A.zd 273 (1944) Norfolk Protestant Hospital v. Plunkett,
162 Va. 1x , 173 S.E. 363 (1934). An interesting approach was taken in Haliburton
v. General Hospital Socy of Connecticut, 133 Conn. 61, 48 A.2d 261 (1946), where
the court said that a charitable hospital is liable for the negligent acts of an employee,
but that it becomes exempt from this liability upon the careful selection and retention
of employees.
"..[i]t should be pointed out that most of the courts' pronouncements on this
subject have not resulted from direct decisions on the question.... Instead, it appears
that they are, largely, the result of dicta. ... In jurisdictions adhering to the rule of
immunity, the matter is rather generally accepted." Gerber and Tyree, supra note x,
at 98.
6This "rule" is named after a 1914 case, Schloendorff v. Soc'y of New York
Hospital, 21x N.Y. x25, 1o5 N.E. 92 0914).
It should be pointed out, however, that in Hordera v. Salvation Army, x99 N.Y.
233 , 92 N.E. 676 (igo), the New York court, while repudiating the trust fund
theory, apparently adopted a modified implied waiver theory. This was expressly re-
jected in Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d a8
(1937).
"'Actually Schloendorff was a refusal to extend the implied waiver theory to in-
tentional torts, and embodied a modified independent contractor theory. The court
there merely suggested the medical-administrative dichotomy.
The independent contractor idea continued to be useful to New York courts and
was extended in Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199
(1924), where a hospital was held not to be liable for an orderly's tort, while the
orderly was performing a job usually handled by a nurse.
The suggestion made in Schloendorff was again recognized in the Appellate Di-
vision, in Brown v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 222 App. Div. 402, 226 N.Y.S. 317 (1928):
"In conducting this business the corporation [a charitable hospital] must have em-
ployees, who are charged with administrative functions. To such persons it is of
course, liable on its contract of employment, and it may incur liability for the acts of
such erployees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. . . ." In 194o, the New
York court acknowledged that it had become settled that even a charitable hospital
is liable for the acts of its servants, stating that "the liability depends not so much
upon the title of the individual whose act or omission caused the injury, as upon the
the character of the act itself." Dillon v. Far Rockaway Beach Hospital, 284 N.Y.
176, ISo, 30 N.E.2d 373, 374 (x94o).
Berg v. New York Soc. for the Relief of the Raptured and Crippled."8
There, the Appellate Division refused to apply the rule to exculpate a
hospital for a negligently performed "medical" act, since the tort had
been committed by a technician, without professional or medical status.
19
It further suggested that the Court of Appeals reappraise the under-
lying rationale of the medical-administrative dichotomy, pointing out
that a hospital is virtually the only employer exempt from liability
for its employees' negligence.20
This opportunity to reconsider the scope of the charitable immunity
rule was presented to the New York Court of Appeals in the recent
case of Bing v. Thunig.1 There, the plaintiff, severely burned in the
course of an operation owing to the negligence of the defendant hos-
pital's nurses,22 recovered in the trial court against the hospital and the
doctor who performed the operation. The Appellate Division reversed
as to the hospital, however, on the ground that the injury resulted
from a "medical" rather than an "administrative" act.2" The Court of
is i N.Y.2d 499, 136 N.E.2d 523 (x956). See Note, 1o Sw. L.J. 317 (x956).
Many difficulties and injustices under the Schloendorff rule because of the sharp line
drawn between a medical and an administrative act are noted. Acts of preparation
immediately before an operation, for example, have become defined as medical acts,
... no matter how simple or how far removed from the concept of a professional
act. .... " Consequently, those definitions must be deemed arbitrary and unsatisfactory
because they do not have as their focal point the element of discretion which is para-
mount in the underlying rule." zo Sw. LJ. 317, 318 (1956).
"' "She was a salaried employee doing routine work requiring a minimum of skill
and training. Therefore, .. .we hold that this particular hospital as the employer
of this particular young woman is liable for her negligence." Berg v. N.Y. Soc'y, for
the Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled, i N.Y.2d 499, 502, 136 N.E.2d 523, 524
(Y956).
"o "Modern hospitals hire on salary not only clerical, administrative and house-
keeping employees but also physicians, nurses and laboratory technicians of many kinds.
Not only do they furnish room and board to patients but they sell them services which
are medical in nature.... What reason compels us to say that of all employees work-
ing in their employers' businesses, the only ones for whom the employers can escape
liability are the employees of hospitals?" Berg v. N.Y. Socy for the Relief of the
Ruptured and Crippled, x N.Y.2d 499, 502, 136 N.E.2d 523, 524. (.956).
2 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957)-
" "[The nurses] had been instructed, not only to exercise care that none of the
[inflammable] fluid dropped on the linen [on which the plaintiff was lying], but to
inspect it and remove any that had become stained or contaminated. However, they
made no inspection, and the sheets originally placed under the patient remained on the
table throughout the operation." Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 66o, 143 N.E.2d 3,
4 (%9s6).
"Bing v. Thunig, i App.Div.2d 887, 149 N.Y.S.2d 358 (956). Three of the
Appellate Division judges voted to reverse, two to affirm. The decision of the
majority was on the ground- that the doctor was primarily responsible that no in-
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Appeals, 24 responding to the challenge raised in the earlier Berg decision,
then reversed and specifically repudiated the Schloendorff rule,28 de-
daring that there is no longer any reason to immunize a hospital from
respondeat superior liability.26 Furthermore, the court dealt summarily
with the contention that doctors and nurses are independent con-
tractors,2 7 pointing out that other highly-skilled employees are con-
sidered' servants for the purpose of imposing vicarious liability upon
their employers,2 and, moreover, the identical acts would, if performed
in a New York public hospital, subject the institution to liability.-"
Fundamental to this willingness to apply respondeat superior liabil-
ity to charitable institutions is an awareness of changing public policy
flammable gasses were in the area of the operation, and that the evidence did not
establish any instructions or rules requiring the nurses to do anything with respect to
removal of the contaminated linen. The dissenters decided that it was a hospital
rule that nurses remove such contaminated linen and that failure to do so would be
administrative negligence.
"This decision was not unanimous. Chief Judge Conway, in a separate opinion,
concurred in the result but dissented to the abandonment of the medico-administrative
act distinction on the ground that the survival of small, voluntary hospitals depended
on this exemption from liability. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.zd 6s6, 667, 143 N.E.ad 3,
s (1957).
"Two reasons were given in the ScMdoadorff case for exempting hospitals from
liability for the negligence of doctors and nurses performing medical acts. The first
was that one who accepts charitable treatment must be deemed to have waived any
right to recover for injuries due to the benefactor's negligence, but this since has been
abandoned as a fiction. See Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 146
N.E. 199 (1924); Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. x63, 7
N.E.zd 28 (1937). The second reason, that such professional persons as doctors and
nurses should be deemed independent contractors, is thus the basic proposition under
consideration.
" "Hospitals should, in short, shoulder the responsibilities borne by everyone else.
There is no reason to continue their exemption from the universal rule of respondeat
superior." Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.id 656, 666, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (1957).
" "The second ground--that professional personnel, such as doctors, nurses and
internes, should be deemed independent contractors, though salaried employees--is in-
consistent with what they have been held to be in every other context and, to a large
extent, even this one." Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 6631 143 N.E.zd 3, 6 (19S7).
" Under the Schioondorff rule, the skill or profession of the doctor became the
criterion of the hospital's liability rather than the fact of his employment" . . . a test
which . . . is without legal or logical basis. One might with equal justice say that
the owner of any kind of public transportation is not responsible as master for the
acts of its skilled employees engaged in flying its airplanes, driving its buses or loco-
motives or sailing its ships; or that the employer of lawyers or accountants would be
free from responsibility for their negligence." Bobbe, Tort Liability of Hospitails in
NewYork, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 419, 428 (.95.).
"See Becker v. City of New York, 2 NY -! 2 L, 14o N.E.2d z62 (1957).
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considerations."0 Courts initially were reluctant to hold charitable in-
stitutions liable for the tortious conduct of their employees, fearing
that the resultant large outlays in assessed damages might cause their
disappearance and so force the state to assume their functions. 1 The
need for this type of indirect subsidy, however, is no longer significant,
in that charities have become better organized and in that hospitals have
become big businesses with large asset holdings and are, accordingly,
better enabled to withstand such suits 2 Thus, a hospital should no
longer be excused from the usual rules of liability for negligence simply
for fear that the charitable function it performs may thus be impaired.
A second factor underlying the change in judicial attitude toward re-
spondeat superior liability is the increased availability of hospital liability
insurance. 4  Since hospitals normally expect to carry a number of forms
of insurance,85 the additional burden of liability insurance would hardly
"°See Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, x65 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956)i
Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash.2d 162, 26o P.2d 765
(1953); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151
(195o). See note 36 infra, indicating the many states which have adopted a rule of
full liability.
"' "We need both the large and small voluntary hospital. The alternative is public
hospitals supported by county or State or stock county hospitals operating as businesses
organized for profitl Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 667, 668, 143 N.E.2d 9, 1o (1957)
(concurring opinion). Bobbe, supra note 28, suggests, however, that those charitable
hospitals in states without the immunity rule have survived.
"An excellent r~sum6 of the change in conditions is given in Andrews v. YMCA
of Des Moines, 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186 (1939). See also, Ray v. Tucson
Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951) ; President and Directors of George-
town College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d So (D.C. Cir. 1942). The Kentucky court, on
the other hand, stated: "We are not convinced. . . . If immunity from tort be
abolished from charitable institutions, larger subscriptions and donations must be ob-
tained to meet heavy premiums on liability insurance, and the present enormous op-
erating expenses of such institutions will undoubtedly mount to dizzy heights." For-
rest v. Red Cross Hospital, 265 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Ky. -954).
" Bobbe, supra note 28.
"' "If it thus protects itself why should it not spend part of its donated funds in
premiums for public liability insurance, . . . ? Everyone who donates for its charity
expects it to carry such protection." Andrews v. YMCA of Des Moines, Z26 Iowa 374,
394, 284 N.W. x86, 2o6 (1939). There is no reason for a charity not to spend part
of its funds on insurance, as on any expense. "The necessity of such insurance is fore-
seeable and the exact cost of it may be calculated by the intending donor. Such donor
would be no more discouraged by this item of expense than by the item of wages, or
light and heat, or similar costs." Appleman, The Tort Liability of Charitable Insti-
tuions, 22 A.B.A.J. 55 (1936). See also, 6 U. CHi. L. REV. 518 (1939).
" "Insurance must be carried to guard against liability to strangers. Adding bene-
ficiaries cannot greatly increase the risk or the premium." President and Directors of
Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d gio, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1942). See note 34
supra.
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be a prohibitive imposition, especially in view of the more just appor-
tionment of the risk of loss which would thereby be achieved.
The decision in Bing v. Thunig may well induce other states to
adopt a doctrine of full liability for charitable institutions. 6  Some
courts seem extremely reluctant to take this step, however, feeling that
such a determination of public policy .hould properly be left to the
legislature.37 But notwithstanding such compunctions, a Pennsylvania
federal court has already been sufficiently encouraged to cast doubt on
the long-standing acceptance of the charitable immunity rule, and,
significantly, perhaps, on the need for legislative action to effect the
change.38  The Bing decision, therefore, may well prove to be instru-
mental in conforming the law in this area to the socio-economic realities
of today.
8 See Gerber and Tyree, supra note i, at 154, which indicates that most states,
at last count, follow some rule in the "twilight zone" between absolute immunity and
liability. Some jurisdictions hold charitable hospitals unqualifiedly responsible for the
negligence of servants in the course of employment. Tuengel v. City of Sitka, i 18 F.
Supp. 399 (D. Alaska 1954) 5 Moats v. Sisters of Charity of Providence, 13 Alaska
546 (1952); Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.hd 220 (1951);
Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753 (1951); Noel v. Menninger
Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954)i Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakon-
niessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920); Welch v. Frisbie Memorial
Hospital, 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.zd 761 (1939); Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital,
74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946); Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St.
467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956) ; Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, ix6 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d
230 (95o); Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital, 43 Wash.zd 162, 260 P.2d
765 (-953)-
Other states have not expressly adopted a rule of complete liability, but have
demonstrated a propensity to repudiate the charitable immunity theories. Tucker v.
Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (x95) i Nicholson v. Good Samaritan
Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940) ; Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687,
100 P.2d 244 (1940); Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 94 Utah
460, 78 P.ad 645 (1938).
"'North Carolina is typical of those states which maintain that the doctrine of
charitable immunity is too well settled to be changed by decision. "For us to withdraw
immunity from charitable institutions at this time, against the existing background of
decisions of this Court, would in effect be an act of judicial legislation in the field of
public policy." Williams v. Randolph Hospital, 237 N.C. 387, 391, 75 S.E.2d 305
(-9s3).
88 Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087 (191o) had made it
clear, apparently, that immunity was to be the law of Pennsylvania and that any change
would be left to the legislature. A recent federal decision there, however, said: "It
is possible, of course, in view of the Bing decision . . . that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania might adopt the enlightened rule of the Bing case... ." Brown v. Moore,
247 F.2d 711, 718 (3rd Cir. 1957), suggesting, perhaps, that Pennsylvania should also
change its position. This may foreshadow a judicial overthrow of the long-standing
immunity rule in that state.
